There have been continual murmurs about the need for reform since the world organization's founding (Luck, 2003) . The eve of the 60th anniversary of the United Nations is remarkably like that of the 50th in at least one way: calls for reform and often-contradictory suggestions to change the Security Council's shape and ways of doing business. The panacea for many critics is reforming the composition and working methods of the Security Council. 'We have reached a fork in the road,' Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2003) told the General Assembly in September 2003. Shortly thereafter, he established the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (HLP) to seek wisdom from 16 experts, including four former prime ministers, about a better process to maximize the chances of reaching consensus.
What he got in their report on 2 December 2004 was a hundred or so recommendations and a promise of a 'grand bargain' to sell to the elusive and so-called international community (United Nations, 2004) . 1 The linchpin for the sales pitch was predictable: it must include Security Council reform. The pitch included increasing the numbers of permanent and nonpermanent members in the Council, while only the permanent members (P-5) would retain veto privilege.
While altering the membership is conceivable, at least on paper, the politics behind agreeing to any changes make it more than unlikely; and there is no chance that the P-5 will ever agree to altering the veto.
2 Moreover, the variations on the changes proposed by the HLP have been under consideration for some time; while they would undoubtedly improve legitimacy, they certainly would not increase effectiveness. The best hope for meaningful change in the Security Council in the next decade lies in reinforcing pragmatic adaptations in working methods and in exploring new ones.
The reasons behind this political reality are found in the second part of this article. First, however, it is useful to share the results of a questionnaire sent to experts on the topic for a roundtable discussion in New York in late October 2004. 3 The 30 discussants represented numerous diplomatic missions to the UN, both in favor of and in strong opposition to Security Council reform, as well as analysts, former UN officials, and activists. The findings turned out to be prescient, and they do nothing to dispel the argument that there is no meeting of the minds about the details, and hence the feasibility of reforms.
Those 'In the Know' Weigh in on Security Council Reform In preparation for an expert roundtable in late October 2004, invitees (whether they were able to attend or not) received a web-based questionnaire. The purpose was to gauge the level of consensus surrounding two types, or clusters, of reforms of the Security Council. The first consists of those requiring Charter amendments, hence specifically related to the expansion of membership, both permanent and non-permanent, and to any modification in the veto privilege. The second consists of mechanisms to increase Security Council accountability, mainly through innovations in procedure.
Survey Pool
The questionnaire data remained anonymous, although respondents were asked to identify themselves by current occupation or affiliation: diplomat, academic/policy analyst, UN official, or representative of a nongovernmental organization. The survey reached some 70 individuals, with an even mix from these types of invitees. The respondents of the survey, however, were less diverse, though they do represent an informed and involved population on the issue. Although we do not know which of the senior diplomats responded to our survey, it reached a key constituency of Security Council reform. Who better to ask about the use of the Arria formula than former Venezuelan ambassador Diego Arria, or about Germany's bid for a permanent seat on the Council than its Permanent Representative Gunter Plueger? Although hardly an exhaustive scientific survey, the exercise presents insights into current thinking within various interested communities. The respondent pool is statistically significant for a small sample, and politically significant for the kinds of observers to Security Council reforms that it reached. Thirty individuals responded, and the majority (18) identified themselves as academics or policy analysts. However, many of them also have experience as practitioners, and many current UN officials, diplomats, and NGO representatives have careers spanning public service as well as research and teaching. Three respondents identified themselves as diplomats, four as UN officials, and one as an NGO representative. Four respondents chose not to specify their occupation, and it is likely (confirmed through informal conversations) that they were diplomats reluctant to take public positions, however anonymous.
Cluster I Reforms: Membership and Veto Privileges
There was significant division among respondents regarding the possibility of reform of Security Council membership and veto privileges in the near future. Regarding membership, a third thought reform likely in the short term, while another third disagreed completely. The remaining third argued that membership reform might be possible in the next five years. These divisions appeared across and within affiliated groups. Figure 1 depicts these findings.
From the qualitative data gathered in the survey, responses were equally divided. Many respondents -whether in academic or official capacitiesplaced a heavy burden on the expected recommendations from the HLP to provide momentum for reform. One academic captured a widespread sentiment: 'The High Level Panel will recommend it and likely have the prestige, and reflect the deep desire for change, to be persuasive.' Others noted the 'growing clamor for representativeness' among the G-77 as the most likely impetus. Skeptics noted two reasons in particular for the lack of a workable reform agenda. The first reason was that 'Europeans are over-represented and until there is a rotating seat, no reform will occur,' as one observer put it. The second reason revolved around the difficulties of agreement on the number of expanded seats within the membership as a whole, and the uncertainty of approaching the US Congress to ratify any Charter amendment. As one anonymous academic/analyst wrote; Any formula other than a simple enlargement of the number of elected members will run into the same continuing difficulties in reaching agreement. Reform limited to increased number of elected members will not satisfy the Japanese, Germans, Indians, Nigerians, etc. Even if a simple increase in elected members is agreed, the ratification process will take more than three years given present attitudes in U.S. Congress.
On the issue of reforming the distribution and use of the veto, there was virtual unanimity among survey respondents. Twenty-six of the thirty expected no change in the veto, even if new members were added to the Security Council. Respondents gave two key reasons for the impossibility of a change in the privilege: the P-5 would never allow it, and member-states of the global South are unlikely to come to any agreement among themselves.
When queried about any possible Charter reform in the near future besides that related to the Security Council, three recommendations surfaced among the survey pool: reformation of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), removal of the 'enemy state clauses' from the UN Charter, and a change in use of the Trusteeship Council. Some creative Charter amendments included a mandatory reconsideration of the Council every 15 years, the introduction of weighted voting in the General Assembly, and abolishing the two-year rotation rule.
Cluster II Reforms: Procedures and Transparency
The Security Council currently uses a number of mechanisms that enhance accountability and facilitate the flow of reliable information among the members of the Council, and of the world organization as a whole. Our survey asked respondents to rate eight mechanisms in terms of their usefulness and the optimal frequency of their use.
The so-called Arria formula's consultations by the Security Council with outside experts, civil society members, and individuals able to provide relevant information on peace and security crises were clearly popular.
4 Among the survey respondents, an overwhelming majority found these consultations useful, though a third found their sparing use to be vital. In the case of many of these innovations, the ability to access external experts and commissions, as well as convening sessions with UN senior staff and diplomats, Question: Please rank the following possibility for accountability according to your opinion on its respective feasibility and desirability. Please assess the possibility based on the following three categories: (a) would be desirable and feasible; (b) is desirable but not feasible; (c) is neither desirable nor feasible.
Figure 7. Use of Advisory Opinions of the International Criminal Court
Question: Please rank the following possibility for accountability according to your opinion on its respective feasibility and desirability. Please assess the possibility based on the following three categories: (a) would be desirable and feasible; (b) is desirable but not feasible; (c) is neither desirable nor feasible Views about two more contentious innovations in procedure also surfaced. More than half of the survey respondents found the use of the General Assembly when the Security Council is deadlocked to be neither desirable nor feasible -unsurprising because 'Uniting for Peace' is discussed more easily than used. 5 This dominant view was shared across all groups. The second and somewhat surprising possible innovation involved advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). More than half of the respondents found greater use of the World Court to be both desirable and feasible -which is surprising, as advisory opinions have not been widely used and take years to be issued, which undoubtedly also explains why a third of respondents found such potential use of the ICJ to be neither desirable nor feasible. Figures 6 and 7 contain details of these findings.
When asked for open-ended suggestions to improve Security Council accountability and effectiveness, survey respondents offered a number of suggestions. Some proposed increased information access, including closedcircuit television coverage of Security Council sessions and published transcripts of debates and presentations in informal consultations. Others suggested more regional integration and information-sharing among member-states, including regional rapporteurs and regular meetings of Security Council members with their General Assembly regional counterparts. Only one respondent put forward the idea that two permanent members of the Security Council be required to constitute a veto, a suggestion that circulates elsewhere.
During Kofi Annan's tenure, there have been a number of initiatives in the Security Council and elsewhere. What the Secretary-General at the start of his first mandate called 'the quiet revolution' -that is, changes that could be initiated without altering treaties or asking the approval of member-states in resolutions -has, according to our respondents, improved efficiency and accountability (Annan, 1998) . According to a June 2002 report, the Council's Cluster II reforms regarding transparency, inclusiveness in proceedings, and accessibility to the General Assembly should continue (United Nations, 2002b) .
In short, the expert survey provided some confirmations of general expectations regarding existing reform proposals on membership and veto privileges, while also offering largely supportive assessments of innovations already underway in the Security Council. The latter hold more immediate potential than unrealistic expectations for Charter amendments. The question of who makes decisions about international peace and security within the Security Council has been debated since 1945. The number of nonpermanent (or elected) members to the Security Council was increased only once, in 1965, to reflect the influx of newly independent member-states in the General Assembly. Although this Charter amendment reflected a slow erosion of the material foundations of the post-World War II world, it did not directly or immediately threaten the West and the socialist bloc; it also left unchanged the permanent (or non-elected) members. With increased activism after the Cold War, changing the Security Council's composition (that is, the numbers of permanent and non-permanent members) and authority (specifically the role of the veto) is once again a prominent item on diplomatic agendas. As evidenced here, there are a number of proposals under review, and the reform process, specifically through the General Assembly Working Group on the Security Council, continues to debate much and agree on little -as has been the case since it began work in 1993. The one issue on which the Working Group has been able to agree has been to continue meeting, taking into account its 'progress' in the 48th through 57th sessions on the issues of equitable representation and increased membership in the Security Council (United Nations, 2003a: paragraph 26). As Bardo Fassbender (2004: 341) argues, there is 'global agreement' on the need for comprehensive reform, but conflicting views of the member-states continue to block a solution. While it is true that the Council does not reflect the actual distribution of 21st-century power, none of the proposals addresses the imbalance between seats at the table and actual military capacity outside of the Security Council chamber.
According to Fassbender and other knowledgeable observers, the terms, and thus the areas of contention, of the 'global agreement' tend to be:
• All governments seem to support an enlargement of the council's nonpermanent members, though there is no consensus on the number of additional members. A majority of governments agree to increase the number of permanent members, but others (mostly current permanent members) strongly disagree.
• Among governments that support additional permanent members, there is no agreement on the candidates, specifically the top contenders Germany and Japan.
• A majority of states within the General Assembly want to abolish or curtail the right of the veto. The Permanent Five absolutely reject this proposal. Moreover, there is widespread disagreement within the Council (and within General Assembly membership) on the distribution of veto privileges to new permanent members. (Fassbender, 2004: 341-342) 6 Since the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, not much has changed on these respective positions, and the discussions and negotiations reveal no substantial modifications. Furthermore, even the pressure for discussing such changes evaporated for a time after the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, the war in Iraq, and the effective beginning of the post-post-Cold War era. The priorities among most UN memberstates shifted toward using the Security Council to constrain US power.
The HLP in Historical Perspective
In thinking about the latest plea for Security Council reform, it is important to recall that efforts to balance the world organization's most important body have a long history. For that reason, the reform issue is better dubbed a 'process', as it continues to evolve through the leadership of various secretaries-general and through organic calls from the floor of the General Assembly (Luck, 2002) . The UN Charter originally provided for a Security Council with eleven members, consisting of five permanent and six non-permanent members. It was amended on 17 December 1963 to increase the number of nonpermanent members from six to ten. These amendments entered into force on 31 August 1965, two decades after the end of the San Francisco conference. Other aspects of the composition or the work of the Council were not agreed at that time.
The question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council was inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1979 by a host of developing countries. From 1980 to 1991 the item remained inscribed on the agenda, but the General Assembly decided to defer its consideration.
At its 47th session, in 1992, the General Assembly requested the SecretaryGeneral to invite member-states to submit written comments on a possible review of the membership of the Security Council, and also requested that he submit to the Assembly at its 48th session a report with comments by them. The survey of member-states proceeded to push the issue to diplomatic agendas, and in July 1993 the Secretary-General submitted a report containing comments made by 79 member-states and three regional constituencies The Open-Ended Working Group met in the subsequent 48th, 49th, and 50th sessions, producing a series of reports to the General Assembly and various recommendations on the two clusters of issues regarding Security Council reform. After three sessions and numerous meetings and proposals, no consensus emerged. Against the background of the special commemorative meeting of the Assembly on the occasion of the half-century anniversary of the United Nations, the group adopted a declaration on 24 October 1995, which stated that the member-states and observers will give to the 21st century a UN equipped, financed, and structured to serve effectively the peoples in whose name it was established. It further stated that:
the Security Council should, inter alia, be expanded and its working methods continue to be reviewed in a way that will further strengthen its capacity and effectiveness, enhance its representative character and improve its working efficiency and transparency; as important differences on key issues continue to exist, further in-depth consideration of these issues is required. (United Nations, 1996: paragraph 7) Between that session and the 57th, the Working Group continued to meet, though its momentum slowed between 1998 and 2002. The most notable compilation was the March 1997 reform proposal under the aegis of the chair, Ambassador Razali Ismail.
7 His key recommendations included increasing the membership of the Security Council to 24 members (five permanent and four non-permanent additions), according to geographical distribution; reserving veto use for Chapter VII action only; not extending the veto privilege to new permanent members; and a provision that would require new and existing permanent members to pay the same surcharges and rates for peacekeeping assessment expenses.
The only two signs of movement within this period were limited in scope. First, on 23 November 1998 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 53/30, which follows the Working Group's recommendation to require a majority of the Assembly for any decisions regarding Security Council reform. Second, on 8 September 2000 heads of state and government adopted the Millennium Declaration, by which they resolved 'to intensify our efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects' (United Nations, 2000). This second movement -if it can rightly be seen as such -is more related to momentum for a Millennium Agreement than a continuation of demands specifically related to calls for Security Council reform.
As the 60th anniversary approaches, reform is in much the same place as it was a decade ago. Some 40 years ago, the euphoria of decolonization and the shift in the ratio of General Assembly members to Security Council members necessitated the reform. Rather than a full-fledged discussion, however, the 1963 increase addressed an obvious numerical imbalance in the United Nations. The reform agendas from the 1960s to the end of the 1980s reflected the stalemate of the Cold War. As Peter Wallensteen and Patrik Johansson argue, major changes in the international system -such as wars of liberation, decolonization, and increasing North-South divides -did not change the way the Cold War affected the Council. It was only in the détente period of the late 1980s that the Security Council returned to its original purpose: to function when the major powers cooperated (Wallensteen & Johansson, 2004: 21) . The agreement in 1963 was possible because the addition of any new permanent members was essentially excluded from negotiations (Zacher, 2004: 213) . The debate of the 1990s more forcefully asserted the principle of sovereign equality. At the same time, political correctness failed to address the extent to which the current system flies in the face of geopolitics -for example, the need for the USA to shamelessly court the likes of the three elected African states (Angola, Guinea, and Cameroon) in the debate about going to war in Iraq in 2003.
The activism and initial success of the Security Council in the early postCold War era fueled debate, paradoxically, about the desirability of Charter reform. Mark Zacher cites three reasons for this development in the 1990s. First, Western and Eastern European countries became units of the same bloc, and their joint strength challenged the combined leverage of developing countries as a distinct bloc. Second, the Council began to intervene more than it had during the Cold War, again igniting concern among developing countries about intervention in civil wars. Third, Germany and Japan seized an opportunity to join calls from developing countries to present their case for permanent membership (Zacher, 2004: 214) .
The issue of military power, and particularly military intervention mandated by the Security Council, could be a mechanism for the reinvigoration of the debate on representation within the body. As James Sutterlin (1997: 5) points out, Article 44 of the UN Charter states that any non-member of the Council that contributes troops for enforcement action should have some authority in how those troops are utilized. This 'taxation without representation' clause has not been used, but it remains an important opening for a non-member of the council to join in debate and, according to Sutterlin, offers a precedent that might be built upon to expand the Security Council for decisions on designated (military force) objectives. The veto, threatened Thomas G. Weiss & Karen E. Young Security Council Reform? 143 or actual, is the most-used mechanism for support and opposition to military and civil interventions.
Security Council Cooperation and the Veto
The use of the veto waned after the Cold War: only 17 vetoes directly related to conflict management were invoked between January 1990 and July 2004, in contrast to the 193 over the preceding 45 years (Malone, 2004: 7) . As David Malone notes, only nine vetoes were cast in the entire decade of the 1990s: two by China -over Guatemala and Macedonia, but both relating to ties with Taiwan by these two governments; two by Russia -over Cyprus and former Yugoslavia; and five by the United States -one with regard to Panama and the remaining in relation to the Israeli-Arab conflict (Malone, 2003: 74-75 (Wallensteen & Johansson, 2004: 19) . More than 93% of all Chapter VII resolutions passed from 1946 to 2004 were adopted after 1989. 8 The work of the Council has changed considerably since the end of the Cold War. From 1946 to 1989, the annual average number of resolutions was fifteen; since 1990, the average has been closer to sixty.
Even more telling is the content of these resolutions and the correlations between them and bilateral agendas, specifically Washington's. Before 1989, Chapter VII resolutions made up 5-10% of the Council's work. Since 1989, the amount of Chapter VII resolutions has increased to over 25%. In 2002 alone, 47% of Council resolutions involved Chapter VII enforcement mechanisms (Wallensteen & Johansson, 2004: 20-21) . As cooperation has increased, so has the weight of the Council's enforcement decisions and interventions. The increased invocation of Chapter VII illustrates how the authority of decisionmaking matters in concrete terms.
Of all vetoes between 1946 and 2004, roughly 80% concerned the election of a new Secretary-General and not international peace and security. The total distribution of veto use by permanent member-country is depicted in Figure  8 Council's agenda. Of the 1,400 Security Council resolutions, there are fewer than 100 resolutions each on Asia and the Americas. While more than 400 have dealt with conflicts in Europe, a similar number concern the Middle East and North Africa. Haiti is the only one of 16 sanctions regimes outside of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Wallensteen & Johansson (2004: 25) point out that the Security Council's agenda suggests that international peace and security in the post-Cold War era is approached in different ways in different geographical regions, due in most part to historical and regional ties to key permanent members. These imbalances in issues on the Security Council's table and the voices at the table spur predictable animosity and foot-dragging. The Open-Ended Working Group's most recent report in 2003 reflects a remarkable lack of consensus in states' views over time. On the issue of the number of new permanent and non-permanent members, there has been 'agreement' that the total membership should increase to between 20 and 26 states. On the issue of non-permanent members, the UK, France, and Russia advocated an additional four, though the USA did not originally support any additional members (Zacher, 2004: 214) . As indicated in Figure 9 , the disparity in nonpermanent membership proposals is significant. Figure 9 also illustrates the range of proposals by Security Council members and non-members. The breadth of proposals among regional groups and 'issue' groups, such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), is also striking. Most members of the Western Europe and Others (WEO) grouping support proposals of three to five additional non-permanent members. Eastern European states generally support both five non-permanent and four or five permanent additions. Like their Western European counterparts, Eastern European states support the addition of Japan and Germany as permanent members. At the same time, there are important dissenters: Canada, Italy and Spain do not support any new permanent members.
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The NAM, with its 115 members, has the most flexible proposal, as it supports five permanent and six non-permanent new members but also proposes an additional 11 non-permanent members if the new permanent seats prove impossible. Yet, the group's positions span a variety of disagreements, and the positions within the NAM are diverse. Generally, smaller states with little aspiration to permanent membership support eleven non-permanent additions, though in Latin America many countries favor neither new permanent nor new non-permanent members. The candidacy of Brazil as a permanent member seems to eliminate support for any changes in the region. Only Costa Rica and Chile firmly support Brazil's candidacy for permanent membership. Asian candidates pose a similar regional stalemate.
The states seeking candidacy as new permanent members, India and Japan, are strongly opposed by neighboring Pakistan, South Korea, and North Korea. China is highly unlikely to support the permanent membership of either Japan or India, its traditional nemeses.
Some states in the Global South, particularly in Africa, oppose extending permanent membership unless at least two seats for both Latin America and African states could be assured with the same prerogatives as the P-5, including full veto privileges. Indeed, the Thirty-Third Ordinary Session of the African Heads of State and Government, meeting in Harare on 2-4 June 1997, expressed the continent's consensus against the permanent allocation of Africa's two 'permanent' seats -the logic being that three countries (Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa) would rotate to fill Africa's designated two 'permanently rotating' seats. Periodic elections would help ensure that the countries occupying these seats were responsive to regional politics and priorities, and 'less subject to the strictly national interest of its various members' (OAU, 1997: paragraph 3). These recommendations are further complicated by the longstanding agreement that an Arab state, alternating between African and Asian, remain in the non-permanent rotation.
Perhaps a more difficult issue than arriving at a consensus on the number of members is the institutional decision of how to select them. Whether the Thomas G. Weiss & Karen E. Young Security Council Reform? 147 Sources: Data compiled from Zacher (2004) and Fassbender (2004) . process is carried out by the General Assembly or subcontracted to regional groupings, the outcome of any selection process is far from consensus.
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The USA and Europe With a US global presence as great as that of any empire in history, a possible 'model' for the Security Council is now emerging that resembles the Roman Senate's efforts to control the emperor. Diplomats at the UN described the debate surrounding the withdrawn resolution before the war in Iraq as 'a referendum not on the means of disarming Iraq but on the American use of power' (Traub, 2003: 51) . Complicating the picture further were splits among Europeans about the future design and leadership of the European continent. The European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and NATO joined the Security Council as victims. When the EU members of the Security Council, specifically permanent members France and the UK, cohere on such council business as African issues, they are difficult to oppose. When EU members oppose one another (as on Iraq in March 2003), the results create difficulties in the Council and reduce the credibility of the EU as a political unit.
The United States is a Security Council member like no other for the foreseeable future. French President Jacques Chirac's continual references to a 'multipolar world' increase the perception of the absence of a substantial challenger in the foreseeable future, other than perhaps China (Smith, 2004 ). Washington's domestic and foreign policy, in many ways, directs the action and agenda of the Security Council. This 'instrumental approach' to multilateralism, or 'ambivalent multilateralism' as it is also called, might be the most effective use of the Council (Malone, 2004; Ikenberry, 2003) . As David Malone (2004: 637) argues, 'A Council that is not an instrument of U.S. foreign policy would probably be as ineffective as the League of Nations.'
In effect, there are two 'world organizations': the United Nations, which is global in membership, and the United States, which is global in reach and power. While critics of US hegemony want power to be based on authority instead of capacity, the two are inseparable. As the world organization's coercive capacity is always on loan, UN or UN-approved military operations only occur when Washington signs on. The value added of other militaries is mainly political and not operational in any meaningful way for enforcement, as opposed to traditional peacekeeping. This reality will not change until Europeans spend considerably more on defense to have an independent military capacity. There is little evidence, (Moravcsik, 2004) . As recent studies suggest, the glass of European defense cooperation in the international organization may be described as half-full or half-empty. As governments stretch their military capacities and out-of-region commitments, European defense cooperation will either rise to the challenge or be clearly under-powered (Giegerich & Wallace, 2004) . Can the Security Council engage Washington, moderate its exercise of power, and restrain its impulses (Malone, 2004: 617) ? Part of the reason behind the establishment of the High-Level Panel in the first place was 'keeping Washington in the tent'. The problematic occupation of Iraq seems to have demonstrated to at least some observers in American policy circles the heavy costs -diplomatic and economic -of unilateral action. US interests could be pursued through multilateral institutions and decisionmaking procedures.
In spite of the dire predictions about the health of the world organization and the need for a dramatic reform in the Security Council, the choice is not between the UN as a rubber stamp and the UN as a cipher -between the axis of subservience and the axis of irrelevance. Depending on the issue and the stakes, the positions of other potential allies, and the plausibility of collective military action, Washington is in the unusual position of pursuing unilateral or multilateral options (Patrick & Forman, 2002; Malone & Khong, 2003) . The trick is to find when 'tactical multilateralism' kicks in, on issues of international peace and security as well as such issues as the environment or pandemics (Boulden & Weiss, 2004) . Thomas G. Weiss & Karen E. Young Security Council Reform? 149 would like to enforce a largely ignored criterion (in the report's words, contributing 'financially, militarily and diplomatically') as part of the selection and re-election criteria of those aspiring to membership. Third, the panel suggests a full review in 2020.
According to a commentary in The Economist (2004) on the basis of an earlier leak about Model A, 'The beauty of this formula . . . is that everyone wins. Some may have hoped for more, but at least no one loses.' But, at that particular point in July 2004, the so-called Gang of Four -that is, Japan, German, Brazil, and India, the four countries with the highest hopes of a permanent seat at the UN's new high table -launched an aggressive attack on the proposal. The result was a two-part proposal from the HLP, which actually is the only time in recent history that an independent commission or panel has made a 'recommendation' that is an option. This would seem to be prima facie evidence of paralysis: If a group of 16 individuals cannot come up with a single recommendation, how will 191 states and their parliaments?
It is unclear how the forthcoming debate will pacify the usual nemeses, or why many delegations will find the suggested changes preferable to the status quo. While prediction is not really in a social scientist's job description, it would surprise us if such changes occur anytime soon. Why? The jealousies and vested interests that have plagued this issue since the 50th anniversary will remain intact for the 60th anniversary and well beyond. It is not clear that the most serious candidates (especially Germany and probably Japan) will agree to take half a loaf -that is, no veto with a permanent seat. It is not clear that Britain and France will accept the inevitable discussion of an EU seat that would be on the agenda at the 15-year review. It is not clear that the USA will agree to consider a 24-member body. It is not clear that some of the main 'losers' (the Italys, Algerias, Mexicos, Pakistans, and Nordic countries of this world) will not go to the mat over the very issues to which they have consistently objected. It is not clear why Arab or Eastern European states would agree to an allocation that makes no specific allocation to them. Nor is it clear how the recommended changes will improve the chances of reaching consensus on decisions regarding the use of force.
Thus, since the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, not much has changed on respective positions, although Germany and Japan appear to have become more impatient about their restricted roles as cash machines. A more important change has been in the occupant of the White House and in US foreign policy since 11 September 2001. Furthermore, the re-election of George W. Bush in November 2004 and the Republican dominance of the US Congress make taking Charter amendments to the US Senate a fool's errand.
In the next decade, the Security Council will retain, in the UN Charter's original words, 'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security'. Yet, the Council will also retain the same permanent members with vetoes and, in all likelihood, the same number of elected members. In short, the HLP's recommendations will remain a dead letter.
'Rarely have such dire forecasts been made about the UN,' wrote Kofi Annan in his 2003 report on the work of the organization (United Nations, 2003b; paragraph 2). He was referring to a veritable din of criticism that seemed to suggest that without a more effective and less anachronistic Security Council the world organization could not survive. Such ominous predictions have come and gone with great regularity over the last 60 years, and the lack of real change in the Council in the foreseeable future will neither confirm nor deny the latest batch, including those of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.
While rhetorical fireworks over the last decade have not and will not enable Charter amendment per se, they undoubtedly have contributed to a permissive environment that facilitated pragmatic modifications in working methods (United Nations, 2002b) . These respond in concrete, though small, ways to the need for more openness and accountability as well as more diverse inputs to decisionmaking. They have made a difference, including improving the 'democratic accountability' of the Council (Ku & Jacobson, 2003) . Such modifications in working methods are unlikely to make a substantial dent in the national-interest decisionmaking by states in the Security Council under its current membership and procedures, but neither would changes in the UN Charter. The gains in transparency from such modifications, nonetheless, are not trivial. The potential to foster them and to invent new ones is a more promising way to improve Security Council accountability and effectiveness than overly optimistic notions about amending the Charter.
Will the inability to move ahead with dramatic reforms compromise UN credibility on matters shaping the future use of force? The answer is probably not, or at least not more than in the past. The dithering about the slowmotion genocide in Darfur, for instance, reflects geopolitical realities that would be even more prominent in a Security Council that resembled a 'rump General Assembly'. 
